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By Nikki Buck*
¶1

¶2

A debate is raging over the constitutionality of gene patents and their effect on the
availability of genetic diagnostics and therapies. Whether gene patents are in fact
constitutional is for the courts to decide. Rather, this Comment will argue that patents for
isolated human genes positively affect society as a whole, with particular emphasis on
patients in need of genetic innovations. Gene patents elevate genetic engineering beyond
the realm of basic science and spur important advances in therapeutic technology.
Part I(A) will introduce the history of the American patent system, with particular
emphasis on patents in the field of biotechnology. Part I(B) will then discuss the basic
science behind genes and the utility of isolated DNA. Part II will introduce the legal
debate concerning the patentability of isolated DNA with an overview of the Myriad
cases. Part III will discuss the economic advantages and disadvantages of gene patents
and will introduce the arguments levied on both sides of the issue. Part IV will conclude
the paper with a summary of this author’s argument that gene patents act as integral
incentives for biotechnological progress.
I. INTRODUCTION TO GENE PATENTS

¶3

To understand the debate over gene patents, it is necessary to first delve into the
history of patent law and its connection to the current biotechnology industry.
A. Why Protect Science?

¶4

The authority of the United States government to grant temporary exclusionary
rights1 to inventors in order to promote science is deeply ingrained in American history.
In 1788, the States ratified the U.S. Constitution, which included Article 1 § 8 cl. 8,
giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”2 The Constitution thus empowered Congress to set
up a system that turned innovation into a property right, thereby allowing a market
*

Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013.
Patents are often considered temporary monopolies over the patented invention. While monopolies
prevent competition within a market, patents merely give the patent holder the right to exclude others from
making, using, and selling his invention. Competitors may still make and sell their own inventions as long
as they do not infringe on the patented invention. For a more thorough explanation of the differences
between patents and monopolies, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 108 (1990).
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1
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system to function.3 The first Patent Act was enacted in 1790, setting forth the power of
the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Department of War, and Attorney General to grant
letters of patent to inventors of any “sufficiently useful and important” invention, art, or
improvement thereof.4
The current Patent Act,5 enacted in 1952, continues in the tradition of the First
Congress. The lenient attitude toward the scope of patentable inventions was
demonstrated in the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952, which states that patents
are available for “anything under the sun that is made by man.”6 The Patent Act sets
forth eligible subject matter as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. ”7
Of course, controversies arose as science blurred the line between nature and
invention. In 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States extended patent eligibility to
living, man-made organisms, ushering in the age of biotechnology. 8 In Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, Dr. Chakrabarty created an entirely new strain of bacteria capable of
breaking down multiple components of crude oil. He did so by inserting non-native
plasmids into the genome of a strain of naturally occurring bacteria that had been
incapable of oil decomposition prior to the insertion of the plasmid.9 In a parallel to the
passage of the Plant Patent Act, the Court stated that “the relevant distinction was not
between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or
not, and human-made inventions.”10 Then in 1982, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) granted a patent to the University of California for the gene
coding of insulin.11 Since then, genetic engineering, which involves scientific
manipulation of DNA to introduce desirable traits, has gained an important foothold in
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. In the late 1990s, the number of patents
on genes worldwide increased rapidly: from around 1,175 granted between the years
1981 and 1995 to over 25,000 DNA-based patents by 2000.12 Gene patents have been
granted under the rationale that “isolated DNA is a discrete chemical compound and . . .
cannot be found in a purified state in nature without meticulous human intervention.”13
3

Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 248 (1994).
1 Con. Ch. 7, April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 190.
5
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), signed into law in 2011, does not affect the issues
presented in this article. For the full text of the AIA, see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
6
Committee Report accompanying 1952 Patent Act, S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 22 Sess., 5 (1952);
H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980) (citing the Patent Act of 1952 in the decision to allow Chakrabarty’s patent over a live organism
since its genome was man-made).
7
35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2006).
8
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
9
Id. at 305.
10
Id. at 313 (referencing the “Plant Patent Act” 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1930)).
11
Lamis G. Eli, Note, When Myriad Genetics Prohibited a Myriad of Options: Association for
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH., & INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 360 (2011).
12
Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of
Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 126 (2002) (citing T.A. Caulfield and E.R. Gold,
“Whistling in the Wind: Patents on Genetic Research Are a Reality. It’s Time to Reframe the Debate”
(2000) Spring Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 75; and Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan and
Stephen J. McCormack, Patents, Secrecy, and DNA, 293 SCI. 217 (2001)).
13
Stephen W. Chen et al., Patent Protection in Medicine and Biotechnology: An Overview, 4 J. HEALTH
& LIFE SCI. L. 106, 127–28 (2011).
4
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The next section will introduce the scientific principles and historical facts underlying the
debate about patent eligibility for genes.
B. The Science Behind Gene Patents
1. Genes Within the Body
¶7

¶8

¶9

The human genome contains approximately 25,000 genes, each of which is coded
by specific sequences of DNA.14 Genes are the units of heredity in living organisms,
responsible for the inheritance of discrete traits.15 The information contained within the
double-stranded DNA molecules that make up the human genome is encoded through a
specific sequence of nucleotides.16 These nucleotides consist of a base linked to a
phosphorylated deoxyribose molecule. The DNA molecule resembles a twisting ladder,
with a sugar “backbone” for the sides of the ladder and paired bases for the rungs. 17
Nucleotides link to other nucleotides within the DNA strand through the sugar
backbone.18 The four different DNA bases (adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine)
pair with their complements on the opposite strand to create the double helix structure of
DNA.19 Adenine (“A”) pairs with thymine (“T”) and guanine (“G”) pairs with cytosine
(“C”). Three bases in sequence create a codon, which codes for a specific amino acid.20
Amino acids are the building blocks of proteins, the basic functional units of the human
body.21 A sequence of DNA that codes for a protein is called a gene.
The process of creating proteins begins with a complete DNA molecule. A gene is
transcribed into an intermediate nucleic acid called messenger RNA (mRNA).22 The
mRNA is then translated into the amino acid sequence of the protein. 23 Like DNA, RNA
consists of bases attached to a sugar-phosphate backbone. However, RNA is only singlestranded and uracil replaces the thymine base present in DNA. 24 The mRNA sequence
complements the DNA sequence from which it is transcribed.25 For example, an original
DNA sequence of AAAGTAGCA is transcribed into the mRNA sequence
UUUCAUCGU.
Only small portions of the gene, called exons, functionally code for a protein. The
excess sequences, called introns, are spliced out of the mRNA before a protein is
created.26 The resulting mRNA strand is about one-tenth the length of the gene that
contains the coding sequence.27 Codons of the mRNA are then translated into specific
14

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
16
ALISON STEWART ET AL., GENETICS, HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC HEALTH GENETICS 24–25 (2007).
17
K.K. JAIN, TEXTBOOK OF GENE THERAPY 5 (1998).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 25.
21
Id.; see also Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
22
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 26.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
In RNA, adenine pairs with thymine, just as it does in DNA. However, since uracil takes the place of
thymine in RNA, uracil pairs with adenine in RNA.
26
JAIN, supra note 17, at 9.
27
Id.
15
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amino acids. For example, the previous mRNA sequence codes for the amino acid
sequence Phenylalanine-Histidine-Arginine. Some amino acids are specified by multiple
codons, and some codons specify stop sequences, which instruct the cellular machinery to
stop the process of transcription and translation at that codon.28 The amino acid
sequence, called a polypeptide, folds into a functional three-dimensional structure: the
protein.29 Some proteins must be modified after translation in order to be functional
within the cell.30
¶10
Genomic DNA is not found floating within the cell ready to be transcribed into
mRNA. Rather, it is wound tightly around proteins called histones and packaged into
twenty-three pairs of chromosomes.31 The chromosomes are directly inherited from an
individual’s parents, twenty-three from the mother and twenty-three from the father.32
When DNA is transcribed or replicated, only a small unit of the chromosome containing
the gene of interest is unwound.33
¶11
Changes, or mutations, in the genetic sequence of a gene can result in alterations in
the resulting proteins.34 Mutations may be caused, for example, by environmental
factors, errors in DNA processing, and inheritance (if the mutation occurs in a sex cell,
also known as a germline mutation).35 Point mutations consist of a single nucleotide base
change that can result in translation of a different amino acid. 36 For instance, if the DNA
sequence above began with a thymine instead of an adenine (TAAGTAGCA), the mRNA
would become AUUCAUCGU. The resulting polypeptide chain would consist of
Leucine-Histidine-Arginine instead of Phenylalanine-Histidine-Arginine. There will be
little or no functional effect on the resulting protein when a point mutation occurs within
a non-operative sequence of DNA (such as an intron), or when the sequence changes a
codon that still encodes for the same or similar amino acid.37 However, when the point
mutation substitutes a very different amino acid or codes for a stop sequence, it may lead
to a vastly different protein—or even no protein at all.38 Larger scale changes in the
DNA sequence include duplication, deletion, and rearrangement of large segments of
DNA.39 The effects of these mutations vary according to the size and location of the
altered sequence.40 Certain mutations are associated with particular diseases. DNA
sequencing can be performed to test whether a person’s DNA contains a certain
mutation.41

28

STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 24.
Id.
30
Id. at 26–27.
31
Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
32
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 195 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
33
JAIN, supra note 17, at 12. A single chromosome contains between 50–250 million base pairs, but
only about 100,000 base pairs are unwound during replication or transcription.
34
Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1339.
35
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 31.
36
Id.; see also Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1338.
37
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 31.
38
Id.
39
Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1338.
40
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 32.
41
Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1338.
29
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2. Isolated DNA: Process and Utility
¶12

In 1990, the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH) launched the Human
Genome Project, a $3 billion effort to create a detailed genetic and physical map of the
entire human genome.42 This effort worked with national genome programs in several
other countries to create a draft sequence of the entire human genome,43 which was
published in Nature in 2001.44 Celera, a private company that had been simultaneously
analyzing the human genome using different methods, published its own draft of the
genome within the same week as the Human Genome Project.45 Since the Human
Genome Project created the “reference sequence,”46 focus has turned to using the
sequence to identify and characterize genes, their functional sequences, and the products
of the genome.47
¶13
An important step in the process of genetic sequencing involves extracting and
purifying DNA from its cellular environment.48 Several well-established laboratory
techniques exist for DNA extraction.49 Often, specific DNA segments are cut from the
chromosomal DNA through the use of restriction enzymes.50 Sections of DNA can then
be separated by size using gel electrophoresis.51 DNA that has been extracted from the
non-DNA materials in the cell is legally termed “extracted DNA.”52 “Purified DNA”
refers to DNA that has been further refined to separate a particular segment of DNA, such
as a specific gene.53 Scientists can also synthesize, or create, DNA molecules in the
laboratory if the sequence is known.54 This artificial DNA is termed “synthesized
DNA.”55 “Isolated DNA,” consists of a “free-standing portion of a native DNA
molecule, frequently a single gene.”56 It may be extracted and purified from native DNA
or synthesized using a known sequence.57
¶14
Purified and synthesized DNA may be used as laboratory tools in applications for
which native DNA may not be used.58 For example, laboratory applications often require

42

JAIN, supra note 17, at 11.
IAN D. YOUNG, MEDICAL GENETICS 5 (2005).
44
Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequence and Analysis of the Human Genome,
409 NATURE 860 (2001).
45
J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCI. 1304 (2001). Considerable
controversy exists concerning Celera’s ability to sequence the human genome without the use of publicly
available maps and sequence data from the Human Genome Project. See STEWART, supra note 16, at 55 for
an analysis of Celera’s methods.
46
The reference sequence does not represent a single human individual, but was assembled from the
DNA sequences of multiple volunteers.
47
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 57.
48
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196 (S.D.N.Y 2010). See also STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 48
(giving a more technical explanation of recombinant DNA technology).
49
Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
50
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 48.
51
Id.
52
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
57
Id.
58
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
43
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large amounts of the sequence of interest.59 There are two main methods of copying and
amplifying (i.e. making multiple copies of) DNA.60 The first method, molecular cloning,
harnesses the replication properties of a host organism, often a single-celled organism.61
The target DNA is inserted into the host genome through the use of a vector, which
includes all the necessary sequence information to make the host copy the target DNA
when it multiplies.62 The second method of DNA amplification is called polymerase
chain reaction (PCR).63 PCR amplifies DNA exponentially and does not require a living
organism to do so.64 The drawback, however, is that PCR requires a DNA primer, a short
piece of complement DNA that binds to each end of the replicating strand. 65 This means
that DNA may only be amplified using PCR when at least a portion of the sequence is
known.
¶15
Aside from their use in PCR amplification, DNA primers may also be used to
determine the sequence of nucleotides in a DNA molecule in the first place. 66 Short
sequences of nucleotides labeled with fluorescent tags can also be used as “probes,”
which are diagnostic tools often used in conjunction with DNA microarrays to detect
thousands of genes within a single sample.67 Probes bind with complementary sequences
in a sample of DNA within a microarray and tag the specific sequence so it may be
detected by laboratory hardware.68 Overall, the utility of a purified gene or sequence of
interest depends upon its ability to selectively bind to a complementary DNA sequence.69
II. THE MYRIAD CASES
A. Introduction to the Debate: BRCA1/2
¶16

Even before the Human Genome Project mapped the genome, researchers have
been associating diseases with particular genes and genetic mutations. For instance,
researchers at Myriad Genetics, Inc. and the University of Utah Research Foundation
(collectively known as “Myriad”) identified the basis by which genetic mutations of the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes correlate with an increased risk of breast and ovarian
cancer.70 About 5% of all breast cancer cases involve germline mutations of either the
BRCA1 or BRCA2 (BRCA1/2) genes.71 If an individual tests positive for mutations on
59

STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 50.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 51. See also Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 197 (S.D.N.Y 2010)..
65
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 51.
66
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
67
See STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 51 (explaining the use of probes in microarrays); see also
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196–97 (referencing the use of short DNA sequences as probes to be used as
diagnostic tools).
68
STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 51.
69
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
70
Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011). See also Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir.
2012); cf. JAIN, supra note 17, at 155 (stating that mutations in the BRCA1 gene are present in 5% of
ovarian cancer cases of women diagnosed before the age of 70).
71
YOUNG, supra note 43, at 200.
60
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either BRCA gene, she72 has about a 60-80% risk of developing breast cancer within her
lifetime.73
¶17
Myriad used known scientific processes to identify, isolate, and sequence the
BRCA1/2 genes.74 The researchers then developed diagnostic tools to test individuals for
mutations in the BRCA1/2 genes.75 Myriad filed a patent application covering the
isolated and purified DNA containing the BRCA1 gene as well as the diagnostic methods
in 1994, followed by an application covering the BRCA2 DNA and diagnostics in 1995.76
The first BRCA1 patent was issued to Myriad in 1997, and the first BRCA2 patent was
issued in 1998.77 Other clinical BRCA1/2 testing services became available while
Myriad was in the process of using and patenting the BRCA1/2 genes. 78 In early 1998,
Myriad sent one such institution, the University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic Diagnostic
Laboratory (“GDL”), a letter informing it of Myriad’s patents over the BRCA1 gene and
diagnostics, and proposing a collaborative license agreement.79 The proposed license
would have limited GDL’s testing services.80 Later in the year, GDL received a letter
from a law firm that represented Myriad, giving GDL two choices: (1) agree to a
licensing arrangement with the company, or (2) “cease all infringing testing activity.”81
In the letter, Myriad told GDL that it could continue using BRCA testing “for the purpose
of furthering non-commercial research programs.”82 This would have allowed GDL to
perform BRCA testing as long as patients were not informed of the outcome and GDL
received no payment.83 During this time, Myriad also sent cease-and-desist letters and
initiated several patent infringement suits against providers of clinical BRCA diagnostic
testing.84 Since 1999, Myriad has continued to be the only provider of clinical genetic
testing for BRCA1/2 mutations in the United States.85 The plaintiffs in Association for
Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (Myriad I) filed a suit
challenging the validity of Myriad’s patents over BRCA1/2 genes and diagnostic
methods in 2009.86
72

Male carriers of BRCA1/2 mutations are predisposed to prostate and colon cancer, Kenneth P.
Tercyak et al., Parental Communication of BRCA1/2 Genetic Testing Results to Children, 42 PATIENT
EDUC. & COUNSELING 213, 213 (2001), though this predisposition is less severe than the female equivalent.
Males also have about a 5% chance of developing breast cancer within their lifetimes if they have a
germline mutation of the BRCA2 gene. YOUNG, supra note 43, at 200.
73
Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1339.
74
Id. The genetic basis for familial breast and ovarian cancer was identified through a process known as
positional cloning. Id. Researchers identified families with inherited breast and ovarian cancers, gathered
large sets of DNA, and compared the occurrence of cancer with certain markers on the DNA sequences. Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1339–40.
80
Id. at 1340.
81
Id.
82
Id. (quoting the letter received by Dr. Kazazian, the co-director of GDL).
83
Id.
84
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 205–06 (S.D.N.Y 2010),
rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal
reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
85
Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1340.
86
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
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B. Myriad I: United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
1. Opponents of Gene Patents
¶18

The Plaintiffs in Myriad I roughly broke down into two groups: (1) those who were
actually injured by Myriad’s patent rights over the BRCA1/2 genes and diagnostics, and
(2) those who represent others with concrete interests in the availability of BRCA1/2
testing sites. The first group included several patients who could not afford Myriad’s
testing as well as Dr. Kazazian, who received a cease-and-desist letter from Myriad and
ceased BRCA1/2 testing as a result.87 The latter group included patients’ rights groups
such as Breast Cancer Action and medical societies such as the College of American
Pathologists.88 Several amicus briefs were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, arguing that
Myriad’s patents were directed at unpatentable subject matter and violated medical
ethics, among other arguments.89
2. Proponents of Gene Patents

¶19

The case was brought against three different defendants. Defendant Myriad
Genetics, Inc., a for-profit biotechnology company, is the exclusive licensee of the
patents-in-suit.90 It is the only institution currently providing commercial BRCA1/2
testing in the United States.91 Defendant University of Utah Research Foundation took
part in the research that led to the BRCA1/2 patents and is the owner and co-owner of
some of the patents-in-suit.92 Defendant United States Patent and Trademark Office, a
government agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce,93 granted the patents-insuit to Myriad in 1998 and 1999.94 Amici curiae for defendants include non-profit trade
associations, a health advocacy organization, for-profit corporations, and a public
university.95 The amici contend that the patents-in-suit fall within the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 101 and also add that a ban on isolated DNA patents is an undesirable public
policy because patents promote innovation.96

87

Id. at 187–89.
Id. at 186–88.
89
Id. at 190. The amicus briefs submitted by several non-profit public health organizations including
the National Women’s Health Network contends that patents over isolated DNA “stifl[e] innovation and
interfer[e] with patient access to medical testing and treatment.” Id. Another amicus brief submitted by
two non-profit organizations dedicated to protecting indigenous people argued that gene patents violate the
public trust doctrine and patients’ rights to informed consent. Id.
90
Id. at 189.
91
Id. at 189.
92
Id. at 189–90; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
93
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
94
See Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1339.
95
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 190-92. Amici curiae also include a law professor and a patent attorney.
96
Id. Amici also contend that the claims-in-suit are sufficiently limited to avoid claiming products of
nature.
88
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3. Court Opinion
¶20

After discussing factual issues, the court considered the issue of law that is of
greatest importance to this article: whether the composition claims over the isolated
BRCA1/2 DNA were valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.97 The court first considered whether
there was an issue of law or fact upon which to test the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims (in
other words, whether summary judgment should be granted to defendants).98 Defendants
argued that patents are afforded a presumption of validity99 and cited the USPTO’s own
prior consideration of the validity of gene patents.100 The court rejected the proposed
“rule of judicial deference to the USPTO’s practices,” noting that 40% of patents
challenged in courts are found to be invalid and 74% of patents challenged through
reexamination are either canceled or changed by the USPTO itself.101
¶21
Myriad also argued that constitutional property rights apply to its patents. It argued
that “invalidating the patents-in-suit would constitute an unconstitutional taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment . . . or a violation of the United States’ obligations
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).”102 The court rejected the arguments as “unpersuasive,” stating that Myriad’s
takings argument was novel and runs counter to the history of patent claim invalidation
by the courts.103 The court also stated that TRIPS allows governments to consider public
health concerns in the development of its intellectual property law.104
¶22
Next, the court considered whether the matter covered by the patents was
“markedly different” from a product of nature and decided that isolated DNA is not
“markedly different” from native DNA.105 The “markedly different” terminology was
taken from Chakrabarty, in which the Court stated that “the patentee has produced a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one
having the potential for significant utility.”106 The court in Myriad I explained that for
the purposes of § 101, “markedly different characteristics” are those that have “a new or
distinctive form, quality, or property.”107
97

The court also considered the validity of several other patent claims, including two methods claims
over the analysis and comparison of DNA and comparison of the growth rate of cells—which the court
invalidated as unpatentable abstract mental processes and the application of the scientific method itself. Id.
at 232–37. The court dismissed the constitutional claim brought against the USPTO, following the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance. The court stated that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional question
because the patents issued by the USPTO were invalidated. Id. at 237–38.
98
Id. at 220.
99
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
100
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220–21. See also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092,
1092–99 (Jan. 5, 2001); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (finding the
USPTO’s policy of granting utility patents for plants that pass the Chakrabarty “man-made” test
establishes that the plants in question could be patented).
101
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
102
Id. at 221.
103
Id. at 221–22.
104
Id. at 222. It is interesting to note that the court rejected the consideration of public health concerns
and other policy as factual disputes outside the context of the motions, id. at 211, and yet cites an allowance
in the treaty to consider such concerns to exclude diagnostic methods from patentability, id. at 222.
105
Id. at 222, 227–28, 232. For a discussion of the scientific differences between “isolated and purified”
DNA and naturally occurring DNA, see supra Part I(B).
106
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
107
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 223 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 11 (1931), in
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The court rejected Myriad’s argument that the process of isolation and purification
changed the chemical nature of the DNA in question in such a way as to create patentable
subject matter.108 The court contrasted DNA with other chemical compounds eligible for
patent protection, stating that the unique informational quality of DNA makes it the
“physical embodiment of laws of nature.”109 The unique qualities of all DNA, the court
asserted, rendered the structural and functional differences between Myriad’s isolated
BRCA1/2 genes and naturally occurring DNA inadequate to make the patented genes
markedly different from their natural counterparts.110 The court then rejected the
structural differences between natural DNA and isolated DNA as merely differences in
purity, which cannot establish patent eligibility.111
¶24
The court further rejected Myriad’s argument that native DNA contains introns,
while the patents-in-suit cover purified DNA containing only exons.112 To do so, the
court looked to the language of the patent claims, several of which cover DNA “coding
for a BRCA1[/2] polypeptide,” which inherently includes DNA with introns, as well as
solely exons.113 The court stated that the functional, coding portions of the DNA
sequences are identical between the claimed DNA and naturally occurring chromosomal
DNA.114 Overall, the court decided that DNA’s inherent utility in therapeutics and
diagnostics arises from its ability to bind selectively with antiparallel DNA segments. 115
Since this utility is unchanged by the isolation and purification of genetic DNA in a
laboratory, the function of isolated DNA is not markedly different from that of native
DNA.116 The court, therefore, held that isolated DNA is not considered patentable
subject matter.117
¶23

C. Myriad II: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
¶25

In a plurality opinion issued in July of 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision that isolated and purified BRCA1/2 genes
were not patentable subject matter.118

which the Supreme Court rejected patent claims over fruit whose outer surface was treated with an antimold composition. The Court stated that although production of the fruit required “treatment, labor, and
manipulation,” the fruit did not become an “article of manufacture” without possessing a “new or
distinctive form, quality, or property” that the natural article lacks.).
108
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 224, 227.
109
Id. at 228.
110
Id. at 229. The court also rejects Myriad’s contention that § 101 inquiries should focus on the
differences between native and isolated DNA, rather than their similarities as overly broad and untenable.
Id.
111
Id. at 229–30.
112
Id. at 230.
113
Id.
114
Id. This argument ignores the functions of introns which, while largely unknown, include sequences
that may be involved with inhibition or over-expression of certain genes. See A.B. ROSE, Intron-Mediated
Regulation of Gene Expression, in CURRENT TOPICS ON MICROBIOLOGY AND IMMUNOLOGY 277 (2008).
115
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 232.
118
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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1. The Opinion of the Court
¶26

After considering the issue of standing, the Court turned to the issue at hand:
whether the composition claims covered patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The majority wrote that the Supreme Court’s construction of § 101 is broad, but not
unlimited.119 Based on the decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v.
Kalo, the majority stated that the distinction between man-made invention and products
of nature “turns on a change in the claimed composition’s identity compared with what
exists in nature.”120 These changes must be “markedly different” or “distinctive.”121
¶27
Unlike the lower court, the majority in Myriad II decided that the chemical
manipulation of the BRCA1/2 genes that removed it from the genome and created
isolated BRCA1/2 DNA changed the DNA from a natural material to a distinct chemical
entity.122 The majority rejected the lower court’s method of basing the distinctiveness of
isolated DNA on the single similarity it shares with its naturally occurring antecedent: the
information contained within the nucleotide sequence.123 The Court rejected the creation
of a categorical rule preventing patent eligibility for isolated genes, stating that the
Supreme Court has cautioned courts against adding limitations to patent laws that were
not expressed by the legislature.124 Finally, unlike the lower court in Myriad I, the
majority also gave deference to the “longstanding” USPTO practice that allowed for the
patentability of isolated DNA molecules.125
2. Judge Moore’s Partial Concurrence
¶28

Judge Moore’s partial concurrence agreed with the majority as to the issue of
standing, but disagreed with the majority’s reasoning for the allowance of isolated DNA
as patent-eligible subject matter.126 Through a scientific explanation of DNA as a simple
polymer, Judge Moore emphasized the functional differences between fragments of DNA
molecules and the entire genomic structure found in nature.127 The concurrence
challenged the lower court’s contention that isolation of genes is akin to separating out
impurities from a naturally occurring mineral.128 The analysis emphasized the chemical

119
Id. at 1348 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (relying upon Chakrabarty for the
notion that Congress intended patent laws to be given wide scope)).
120
Id. at 1351 (building upon the rules in Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127 (1948) (invalidating a patent covering a mixture of certain strains of bacteria that do not
naturally cohabitate)).
121
Id. at 1351.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1353 (stating that “the patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has similar
informational properties to a different, more complex natural material that embodies it”).
124
Id. See also Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226, 561 U.S. __.
125
See Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1354.
126
Id. at 1358. The concurrence also agreed with the majority’s opinion with regard to the affirmation
of the lower court’s rejection of the method claims, as well as the majority’s conclusion that the cDNA
sequences are patentable. With regard to the composition claims on isolated DNA, the concurrence agreed
with the judgment, but not the reasoning. Id.
127
Id. at 1361–62.
128
Id. at 1363.
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and structural differences between excised (or synthesized) DNA fragments and those
connected to a chromosome.129
¶29
The concurrence, however, did not rely solely on the marked difference in chemical
structure to deem isolated DNA patentable.130 Rather, the concurrence focused upon the
utility gained by the difference in structure.131 Judge Moore gave weight to the possible
uses of shorter sequences of isolated DNA as primers and probes.132 The concurrence did
not go so far as to conclude that isolated DNA sequences that include an entire gene are
eligible for patents based on structural and utility concerns alone. 133 Instead, Judge
Moore, like the majority, gave deference to the policies of the USPTO to allow patents
for isolated natural products.134 Unlike the majority opinion, the concurrence also
expressed deference for the expectations of the biotechnology industry and the thousands
of isolated DNA patents already issued by the USPTO.135 Finally, the concurrence
argued that the court is ill-suited to determine whether or not isolated DNA claims
promote or inhibit science, and therefore leaves the question to the constitutional
authority of Congress.136
3. Judge Bryson’s Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent
¶30

Judge Bryson’s partial concurrence disagreed with both the majority and Judge
Moore’s concurrence with regard to the patentability of isolated DNA sequences. Judge
Bryson simplified the issue down to one question: Are human genes patentable? 137 In a
comparison with isolation of native minerals, Judge Bryson’s opinion stated that “merely
isolating the products of nature by extracting them from their natural location and making
those alterations attendant to their extraction does not give the extractor the right to patent
the product themselves.”138 In the end, Judge Bryson formulated the rule that “the
extraction of a product in a manner that retains the character and function of the product
as found in nature does not result in the creation of a human invention.”139 In a move that
seems to follow the argument of the lower court, Judge Bryson focused upon the
similarity in function between the isolated BRCA1/2 genes and the genes within
chromosomal DNA.140 The partial concurrence limited the patentability of isolated DNA
to applications of gene sequences, and not of the gene sequences themselves.141
129

Id.
Id. at 1365–68
131
Id.
132
Id. at 1365. See also supra Part I(B) for a discussion of DNA fragments as primers and probes.
133
Id. at 1366. (In fact, Moore states that if she were to make the patentability decision based on a blank
canvas, she might conclude that such a DNA sequence would not be patentable.)
134
Id. at 1367 (relying on 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001), which states that the USPTO’s policy
that “[a]n isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is
eligible for a patent because . . . that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature”).
135
Id. at 1368.
136
Id. at 1372.
137
Id. at 1373.
138
Id. at 1375. The dissent further argues against the majority’s fundamental conclusion that cleavage
of the bonds between DNA and the histone proteins to isolate DNA chemically alters the identity of the
DNA. Rather, the dissent likens chemical bonds between atoms to weaker interatomic forces. Id.
139
Id. at 1377.
140
Id. at 1376–77.
141
Id. at 1373. The dissent also delves into the perceived danger of broad patent protection over genetic
130
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D. Subsequent History of Myriad
¶31

In 2012, the Supreme Court took on the issue of patents attempting to claim laws of
nature in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.142 The Court
invalidated method claims that optimized dosage of a drug for the treatment of certain
autoimmune diseases.143 Justice Breyer asserted that merely stating a law of nature and
writing “apply it” in the patent application does not satisfy the requirement that a process
based upon a natural law must also contain an “inventive concept” that amounts to
significantly more than a patent over the natural law itself.144 Just six days after the
Supreme Court decided Mayo v. Prometheus, it vacated the opinion in Myriad II and
remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit for consideration in light of Mayo. 145
¶32
The Federal Circuit’s second review of Myriad resulted in a restatement of Myriad
II’s findings for the composition claims.146 As before, the majority found that the
composition claims directed to the “isolated” DNA and to cDNA cover patent eligible
subject matter.147 Judge Lourie again emphasized the fact that the “isolated” DNA
covered by the patent does not exist in its isolated form in nature. Importantly, Judge
Lourie addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo by stating that Mayo does not
control the subject matter eligibility of composition claims.148 Therefore, Mayo did not
affect the Federal Circuit’s decision in regards to the patent eligibility of “isolated” DNA
and cDNA sequences.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF GENE PATENTS
A. Open-Source Science and Opponents of Gene Patents
¶33

In 1948, the Supreme Court of the United States declared “manifestations of . . .
nature, [are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”149 Though this doctrine
has changed throughout the years, the sentiment that unchanged products of nature are
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 persists.150 Opponents of gene patents argue that
isolated DNA, although chemically altered by the isolation process, is still a natural
substance with the same utility as its native counterpart and therefore is ineligible for
patent protection.151 Beyond the legal arguments described in the Myriad cases,

material as a hindrance to future genetic innovation. This argument, the threat of the anti-commons, is
further discussed in Part III, infra.
142
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 1294. In Mayo v. Prometheus, the patent at issue covered the application of a known
correlation between a levels of certain metabolites in a patient’s blood and the efficacy of the drug
thiopurine. Id.
145
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (mem.) (granting cert
and vacating opinion below allowing the patenting of extracted DNA and remanding for analysis in line
with Mayo).
146
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
147
Id. at 1309.
148
Id. at *15.
149
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
150
See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
151
See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 at 1378 (Bryson, J., dissenting); see generally Jonah D. Jackson,
Note, Something Like the Sun: Why Even “Isolated and Purified” Genes are Still Products of Nature, 89

73

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2013

opponents present policy arguments against the patentability of genes. These include the
notion of the “tragedy of the anticommons” and an overall ethical question about the
justification of incentives to the biotechnology industry.
1. The “Tragedy of the Anticommons”
¶34

In 1998, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg published a highly influential
article applying the notion of the “tragedy of the anticommons” to the patentability of
biomedical research.152 The authors argue that patents on upstream technology—such as
gene sequences—have the unintended consequence of stifling downstream innovation by
imposing burdensome transaction costs.153 These transaction costs arise from the need to
collect all the necessary licenses to use the upstream technologies.154
¶35
Heller and Eisenberg allow that intellectual property protection in biomedical
research incentivizes researchers to undertake risky research projects and could even help
equitably distribute profits across the various stages of research and development.155 On
the other hand, the authors argue that privatization limits future research when too many
entities hold rights to discoveries that serve as obstacles to further research. 156 Heller and
Eisenberg predicted that patents on gene fragments would cause researchers developing
therapeutic proteins and diagnostic tests to bundle licenses together before they could
effectively develop the downstream technologies.157 This clearly relates to the Myriad
cases, in which the exclusive licensee of the BRCA1/2 genes imposed high transaction
costs on entities hoping to license the BRCA1/2 genes and perform their own diagnostic
tests.158 Though the article suggests the possibility of the biomedical research
community correcting its own anticommons problems in ways similar to the actions of
the music industry, the authors identify several impediments to such a concerted
action.159 These include the greater relative importance of patents to the biotechnology
and pharmaceutical industries, the heterogeneity of interests of upstream rights holders,
and even a cognitive bias on the part of patent holders to believe that their patents hold
TEX. L. REV. 1453 (2011).
152
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998). Heller introduced the “tragedy of the anticommons” theory in
broader application earlier that year in an article in the Harvard Law Review. See Heller, Michael, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 3, 621–
88 (1998).
153
Id. at 698. The theory relates to Garrett Hardin’s metaphor in property law of the “tragedy of the
commons,” which has been used to explain such phenomena as overpopulation, species distinction, and air
pollution. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
154
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Symposium, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (2008).
155
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 152, at 698. See also Thomas A. Hemphill, Gene Patents, The
Anticommons, and the Biotechnology Industry, RES. TECH. MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 11.
156
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 152, at 698.
157
Id. at 699. When licenses are bundled together, researchers have the ability to pay one fee in order to
use all the patented technologies within the bundle. While this has the ability to speed up the process and
lower the cost of licensing, it may also cause researchers to pay for licenses within the bundle that they
would not have needed if the licenses had been obtained separately. Also, bundles create a hold out
problem when one patent holder refuses to license his or her technology to others.
158
See supra Part II(B) for a discussion of the facts in Myriad. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
159
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 152.
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the “key” to downstream production, leading these patent holders to hold out for high
licensing fees.160 The “tragedy of the anticommons” ultimately results in abandonment
of research projects that have been deemed too costly from an IP licensing standpoint.161
2. Ethics of Gene Patents
¶36

Opponents of gene patents also present several ethical arguments, including
consent issues involved in personalized medicine, and open source arguments for the
dissemination of information. Patients’ groups contend that certain gene patents violate
individual human rights by bypassing patients’ informed consent.162 For instance, in
2010, members of the Havasupai Native American tribe claimed that Arizona State
University used their DNA samples in ways other than those agreed upon, and won
$700,000 in an out-of-court settlement.163 One court treated DNA donors as “tissue
sources” with no rights to be informed about the possible commercialization of the
tissues to be donated.164
¶37
Unlike in the United States, informed consent is governed by the European medical
community through a directive of the European Union’s Parliament and Council states
that persons from whose bodies biological material is being taken for biotechnological
discovery “must have . . . an opportunity of expressing free and informed consent
thereto.”165 Gene patent consent issues also sometimes involve religious beliefs and fears
about genetic discrimination.166 Reproductive liberty issues also attach to the discussion
of gene sequencing and patenting.167 An in-depth discussion of such ethical issues is
outside the scope of this article.
¶38
Opponents of patents also argue that the commercial incentives of patents will slow
the process of technology by undermining the open-science research norm.168 Since the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, universities and small businesses have had the
ability to claim IP protection over federally funded discoveries.169 Patent opponents
argue that this has led universities away from the historical ideal of open access to basic
research.170 Traditionally, researchers were incentivized to keep science within the
160

Id. at 700–01.
See Jacob D. Moore, Note, The Forgotten Victim in the Human Gene Patenting Debate:
Pharmaceutical Companies, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1277, 1291 (2011); see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note
152, at 700.
162
Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal
Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403, 408 (2005).
163
Arthur Piper, Who Owns Human Nature?, 65 No. 2 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT, April 2011, at 47, 49.
164
Andrews & Paradise, supra note 162, at 410 (referring to Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp., 264
F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003)).
165
Id. (citing Council and Parliament Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 14, recital 26,
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/1_213/1_21319980730en001130021.pdf).
166
Id.; see also Piper, supra note 163, at 49 (discussing the taboo nature of schizophrenia research,
which angered the Havasupai people).
167
Andrews & Paradise, supra note 162, at 410.
168
Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1091 (2006).
169
STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 20, 24 (2006).
170
Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL’Y 455, 469
(2004).
161
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public domain because rewards to scientists were tied to acclaim within the community
following the publication of peer-reviewed articles.171 More recently, many universities
(and their researchers) are aiming to “maximize[] expected revenues from intellectual
property.”172 This new incentive to patent takes away from the traditional open research
incentives, leading to an increase in the secretive nature of academic research, delays in
publication of findings, and resistance to sharing data and research materials.173
B. Counter-Arguments to Opponents of Gene Patents
1. The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Is Not So Tragic
Ten years after the publication of the Science article that catapulted the “tragedy of
the anticommons” into the discussion of biotechnological patent policy, Rebecca
Eisenberg admitted that “intellectual property has presented fewer impediments to
research than policymakers may have projected on the basis of early salient
controversies.”174 In an empirical study of the impact of patents on biomedical research
in United States universities, a research team lead by John Walsh concluded that patents
have had little detrimental impact upon academic researchers.175 Several other empirical
studies reported similar findings.176 A study performed by the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which included both academic and private
researchers, found that only 1% of survey respondents in the U.S. abandoned a research
project as a result of the need to obtain patent licenses. 177 Although approximately 20%
of all human genes are covered by at least one patent, anticommons problems have been
shown to be “relatively uncommon.”178 Eisenberg attributes the lack of obstacles
demonstrated in the studies, in part, to the fact that such empirical studies tend to measure
upstream rather than downstream innovation, but admits that the data demonstrate that
the effects of the “tragedy of the anticommons” are far less serious than predicted.179
¶40
Walsh then focused his research on the anticommons effect of patents covering
upstream research tools upon downstream innovation. He found that the patenting of
upstream research tools has an insignificant effect on downstream diagnostic and
therapeutic discovery. Although there has been an increase in the number of patents on
research tools in the last thirty years, those patents have not impeded biomedical
¶39

171

Id. at 455.
Id. at 469.
173
Caulfield, supra note 168, at 1091. Most writing on the topic of open source science concerns basic
science research and draws a definitive line between “basic” and “therapeutic” or “technology-based”
science. See Nelson, supra note 170, for an analysis of the open science opinion focusing solely on basic
research. See also Paul A. David, Can “Open Science” Be Protected from the Evolving Regime of IPR
Protections 1-27 (Stanford Inst. Econ. Policy Research, Policy Paper No. 02-042, 2003)), for a call to
action to halt the privatization of public domain information.
174
Eisenberg, supra note 154, at 1061.
175
John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021 (2003).
176
Eisenberg, supra note 154.
177
AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXPERIENCES: A REPORT OF FOUR COUNTRIES 6–8 (2007), available at
http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPI_Four_Country_Report.pdf.
178
Caulfield, supra note 168, at 1091.
179
Eisenberg, supra note 154, at 1075.
172
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innovation.180 Several factors led to the rise in patents on research tools, including
increased patenting by the biotech industry generally, the allowance of patents over
university research following the Bayh-Dole Act, and the rise of defensive patenting by
biotech companies.181
¶41
The increase in the complexity of the patent landscape would lead believers in the
anticommons problem to expect a resulting decrease in innovation. Yet, the Walsh study
found no such evidence. In fact, of fifty-five researchers surveyed, only one reported an
instance during which a breakdown in the negotiations for rights to a research tool
resulted in the termination of a project.182 Also, though the number of licenses obtained
by researchers has increased in recent years, the number appears to remain relatively
small and the fees did not cause researchers to abandon projects. 183 In fact, researchers
reported “the productivity gains conferred by the licensed research tools were thought to
be worth the price.”184 This shows that researchers are willing to bear the costs of
licensing upstream research tools because they increase the productivity of downstream
innovations.
C. Benefits of Patents in the Realm of Biotechnological Innovation
¶42

The private United States biotechnology (“biotech”) and pharmaceutical industry
spent approximately $49 billion on biomedical research in 2006, accounting for 41% of
national biomedical research spending.185 Private biotech and pharmaceutical companies
“must invest hundreds of millions of dollars in research and development over many
years to bring their products to market.”186 Estimates place the cost of developing and
testing a new pharmaceutical entity in the 1980s and 1990s above $800 million.187
Furthermore, this cost “has increased and seems destined to continue increasing,” causing

180

See John P. Walsh, et. al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation,
in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
2003) (assessing the empirical evidence regarding effect of patents on research tools, or inputs to drug
discovery, between the years 1986 and 2003). Gene sequence patents, like the patent at issue in the Myriad
cases, can be considered patents on research tools because genetic sequences serve as starting points for
further diagnostic and therapeutic research.
181
Id. at 294–95. See also Caulfield, supra note 168 (explaining the rise of patenting by universities
following the Bayh-Dole Act). The term “defensive patenting” refers to the practice of patenting often
used in the telecommunications industry in which each small part of an invention is patented separately in
order to protect a company from a possible future infringement suit. See Walsh, supra note 180, at 295, for
an example of defensive patenting.
182
Walsh, supra note 180, at 295.
183
Id. at 294–95, 300. Researchers reported that while the number of patents that are initially
considered for licensing is high—sometimes on the order of hundreds—the number of licenses that are
necessary to obtain is “substantially smaller”—often closer to 3 to 6.
184
Id. at 301.
185
Elias A. Zerhouni, Special Communication, Nat’l Inst. Health, U.S. Biomedical Research: Basic,
Translational, And Clinical Sciences, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1352 (2006).
186
MERRILL ET AL., supra note 169, at 20.
187
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J.
HEALTH & ECON. 151–85 (2003) (estimating the cost for new chemical entities to be $820 million in year
2000 dollars based on studies of pharmaceuticals developed between the years 1983 and 1994). See also
Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and
Development, 3 NATURE REVIEWS 417, 424–26 (2004)(placing the cost of development of new
pharmaceuticals as high as $897 million in year 2000 dollars).
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pharmaceutical innovation to be more expensive today.188 Biotechnological innovation
may in fact be more expensive than traditional pharmaceutical discovery. 189 The increase
in expense stems from the riskiness of the drug development process, higher research and
development costs, and highly specialized manufacturing and distribution processes when
compared with those for traditional chemical entities.190 More recent estimates place the
cost of development of biopharmaceuticals—therapies based on mechanisms within the
human body rather than strictly chemical compounds—above $1.2 billion.191
¶43
The high cost of pharmaceutical innovation makes intellectual property protection
“essential” to the industry.192 Studies demonstrate that the incentive effect of patents is
more pronounced in the pharmaceutical industry than in other realms of science. 193 One
study demonstrated that biotech firms expect to earn between 45–79% more on patented
inventions than they would earn on those inventions if they had not been patented.194
Patents are especially important—even critical—to start-up companies, which require
significant investment from outside sources.195 The surge in new entrants into the biotech
industry in the last twenty years is widely attributed to the availability of patents in
biotechnological innovation.196
¶44
The increased expense of biotechnological innovation further emphasizes the need
for patent protection.
Without patents, innovation would be hindered by the
“appropriability problem.”197 This doctrine states that if an entity is unable to recover the
costs of research and development because the resulting information would be available
to the general public, then there would be a suboptimal level of innovation.198 To
contend with this problem without abandoning innovation, genetic researchers often turn
to trade secrecy to protect the value of their discoveries. 199 The use of trade secrets to
protect DNA sequences limits the free flow of information within the research
community. The scientific community’s traditional emphasis on disclosure and
information sharing would fall by the wayside if trade secret became the main method of
intellectual property protection.
188

Dickson, supra note 187, at 419.
Bill Edelman, Explaining the Cost of Biotech Therapies, BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 37, 38
(2004) (stating that “it is a reasonable bet that most biologics would be of higher than average cost” when
compared with traditional pharmaceutical entities).
190
Id.
191
Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech
Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469 (2007).
192
MERRILL, supra note 169, at 20.
193
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent
Litigation 10 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 05–22,
2005).
194
Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium 30, 47 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9431, 2003). According to Arora, the patent premium for the biotech industry was higher than
that of any other industry, including traditional pharmaceuticals.
195
Walsh, supra note 180, at 287 (quoting the licensing director of a large pharmaceutical firm as
saying, “Patents are critical to start-ups. Without patents, we won’t even talk to a start-up about
licensing.”).
196
Id.
197
Dam, supra note 3, at 247.
198
Id.
199
Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan & Stephen J. McCormack, Patents, Secrecy, and DNA, 293 Sci. 217,
217 (2001) (stating that trade secrets are the primary intellectual property regime for the most valuable
DNA sequence data).
189
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Patents simultaneously incentivize investment in innovation and disseminate
information to the scientific community, solving both portions of the “appropriability
problem.”200 In fact, most patents filed in the United States are published after eighteen
months, establishing a limitation for the time period of secrecy for researchers who
choose to patent their innovations by requiring that the invention is disclosed.201 In the
case of patents covering DNA sequences, this publication rule restores the informational
value contained within the DNA sequence.202 Some researchers even argue that patents
facilitate the exchange of technological information “by forcing would-be copyists to
invent around and or to pursue alternative avenues of research. . . .”203 For instance, a
patent on a gene sequence claims only uses of the sequence itself, not the protein or
smaller expressed sequence tags (ESTs) of cDNA. Researchers are encouraged to
discover the use of the protein without dealing directly with the gene sequence. 204 The
existence of patents may actually spur superior scientific advances by forcing researchers
to develop new technology that works around existing patents.
IV. CONCLUSION

¶46

In the case of isolated genes, patent eligibility acts as a critical incentive for
scientific research. The costs of research and development of research therapies act as a
barrier-to-entry that may only be overcome through the influx of capital supplied by
investors looking to make a return on their investment. As the costs of research,
development, and testing have soared within the biotech industry, patents have become
crucial to start-up companies and established companies alike. Thus, useful, often lifechanging, technologies would never be available to patients if not for the USPTO’s
decades-long practice of granting gene patents.
¶47
Opponents of gene patents argue that the allowance of exclusive rights over
upstream research technology will have a deleterious effect on downstream innovation.205
Researchers termed this theory the “tragedy of the anticommons.” 206 Empirical studies
have shown that the “tragedy of the anticommons” does not exist within the realm of
biotechnology.207 Though patents on upstream research tools have increased throughout
the years, downstream technology has not been hindered.208
¶48
In the words of the U.S. Constitution, patents “promote the progress of science and
useful arts”209 by incentivizing both discovery and disclosure. Gene patents provide
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important monetary incentives for companies developing downstream technology without
violating the traditional open information norm of the scientific community. Empirical
data has shown the “tragedy of the anticommons” to have an insignificant practical effect
upon biomedical innovation, while gene patents themselves spur innovation by providing
for an influx of capital for corporations performing important biotechnological research.
Without gene patents, researchers lose out on a large source of potential funding and may
turn to trade secrets to protect discoveries. Overall, gene patents lead to important
medical discoveries by incentivizing research, providing for monetary capital, and
allowing the free flow of scientific information.
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